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REVISING REASONABLENESS IN THE CLOUD
Ian Walsh*
Abstract: Save everything—just in case––and search for it later. This is a modern mantra
fueled by the ubiquity of smartphones, laptops, tablets, and free or low-cost data storage that
leads users to store massive amounts of data in the cloud. But when users trust third-party cloud
storage providers with private communications, they also surrender Fourth Amendment
constitutional certainty. Existing statutory safeguards for these communications are lower than
Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause standards; this permits the government to seize
large quantities of users’ private communications stored in the cloud with only minimal
justification. Due to the revealing nature of such communications, the existing protections for
them are insufficient under the Fourth Amendment. To prevent broad intrusions into users’
reasonable expectation of privacy, this Comment proposes an approach akin to Berger v. New
York, where the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that allowed invasive real-time
eavesdropping because the statute did not require sufficient particularization. Like in Berger,
seizures of private communications in the cloud should require a warrant based on probable
cause that is sufficiently particularized to protect against indiscriminate, large-scale data
collection and roving searches by the government.

INTRODUCTION
Approximately 266 million people in the United States own
smartphones—accounting for 81% of Americans.1 The United States
Supreme Court has observed that modern cell phones store “a digital
record of nearly every aspect of their [users’] lives—from the mundane to
the intimate” and are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important
feature of human anatomy.”2
The convenience and ubiquity of modern devices result from
technological developments that enable fast communication and highcapacity storage, provided through online platforms run by third parties
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. Special thanks to Professor
Mary Fan for her helpful guidance and insightful edits. I would also like to thank the entire
Washington Law Review editorial staff for their invaluable assistance, especially Oliana Luke, Monica
Romero, and Quynh La.
1. The population of the United States was estimated to be 328,239,523 in 2019. Press Release,
U.S. Census Bureau, 2019 U.S. Population Estimates Continue to Show the Nation’s Growth Is
Slowing (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/popest-nation.html
[https://perma.cc/TJ8K-N3CE]. Multiplying this population by estimated smartphone ownership of
81% equals 265,874,013 people. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/8VSE-GMNZ].
2. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385, 395 (2014).

343

Walsh (Do Not Delete)

344

3/22/2021 12:18 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:343

such as Apple and Google.3 Use of these platforms is colloquially known
as storing data in “the cloud.”4 Users store much of the personal data from
their smartphones and computers in the cloud.5 But when users share data
with third-party cloud storage providers, they may surrender Fourth
Amendment constitutional protection.6
The Fourth Amendment safeguards people and their effects from
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”7 The framers of the Constitution
established this protection to repudiate the colonial-era English practice
of using general warrants to conduct invasive and unjustified searches for
evidence of possible wrongdoing.8 To limit the authority of officers, the
Fourth Amendment requires that warrants be founded on probable cause
and describe with particularity both the “place to be searched” and the
“persons or things to be seized.”9
However, the Fourth Amendment’s reach has been limited when
information is disclosed to third parties.10 This is significant because
modern devices rely on third-party cloud platforms for data storage.11
Smartphones use cloud storage for a variety of features, including backing
up important data.12 Computers also often incorporate cloud platforms
such as OneDrive, Google Drive, and Dropbox to provide convenient
cross-device access.13 The integration of these platforms with a wide array
of devices means that users both wittingly and unwittingly store data with
vast depth and breadth in the cloud.14
Given the limitations of the Fourth Amendment, the primary protection
for private communications stored in the cloud is a statute called the
Stored Communications Act (SCA).15 The SCA was enacted in 1986—
3. See infra Part I.
4. See What Is the Cloud?, MICROSOFT AZURE, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/overview/whatis-the-cloud/ [https://perma.cc/UT4C-NGCJ] (“Instead of accessing files and data from a local or
personal computer, you are accessing them online from any Internet-capable device—the information
will be available anywhere you go and anytime you need it.”).
5. See infra section I.B.
6. See infra section II.B.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. See infra section II.A.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see infra section II.A.
10. See infra section II.B.
11. See infra section I.B.
12. See infra section I.B.
13. See infra section I.B.
14. See infra section I.B.
15. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13. The statute was first enacted as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
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over thirty years ago—and permits the government to obtain information
stored in the cloud using standards that fall below Fourth Amendment
baselines.16 In the context of private communications stored in the cloud,
these lower standards conflict with the framers’ abhorrence of
unreasonable general warrant searches and seizures that motivated the
Fourth Amendment’s adoption.17
What constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure changes as
technology progresses.18 Over the past twenty years alone, the Supreme
Court has addressed the privacy impacts from thermal imaging of homes,
searches of phones incident to arrest, and cell site location data.19 In 1967,
the Court confronted the then-modern technological innovation of realtime wiretapping in Berger v. New York.20 This decision recognized that
the privacy invasion from real-time eavesdropping on telephone
conversations through wiretapping, if left unchecked, would be the
functional equivalent of general warrant searches.21 The Court was
especially concerned because the New York statute that authorized
eavesdropping did not require a warrant or sufficient particularization and
instead gave officers “a roving commission to ‘seize’ any and all”
communications.22 To prevent invasive general-warrant-like seizures, the
Court required a warrant—based on probable cause—and “precise and
discriminate” particularization procedures.23
Today, Americans face a privacy threat akin to wiretapping in the form
of government searches and seizures of private communications stored in
the cloud. To effectively safeguard a reasonable expectation of privacy
for Americans, this Comment proposes a Berger-like Fourth Amendment
approach.24 A warrant that is supported by probable cause should be

No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). It has been
referred to by various names, including “Chapter 121” and “Title II”; for simplicity, this Comment
refers to this statute as the “Stored Communications Act” or “SCA.” See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide
to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1208, 1208 n.1 (2004).
16. See infra section II.C.
17. See infra section I.B; infra Part IV.
18. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (interpreting the
Fourth Amendment to “assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
19. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35 (thermal imaging); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–02
(2014) (cell phones incident to arrest); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (cell site location information).
20. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
21. See id. at 59.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 58–59.
24. See infra Part IV.
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required.25 Additionally, because of the broad scope of the intrusion and
the highly revealing nature of information stored in the cloud, the warrant
should be subject to “precise and discriminate” enhanced particularization
requirements that minimize the scope of the seizure.26 This enhanced
particularization heeds the repeated call of the Supreme Court to “assure[]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”27 Like with Berger, Congress
should recognize technology’s power to undermine privacy and enact a
comprehensive statute that exceeds this constitutional baseline.28
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines how modern
technological advances have impacted the invasiveness of searching and
seizing communications from cloud storage platforms.29 Part II evaluates
the existing protections from such seizures, both constitutionally and
statutorily, and explains some of their limitations.30 Part III explores how
the Supreme Court has confronted various intrusive technological
advancements in the past.31 Part IV then proposes a Berger-like approach
to protect a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud that should be
a constitutional backstop to any new statutory framework.32
I.

TECHNOLOGY ENCOURAGES USERS TO STORE VAST
AMOUNTS OF DATA IN THE CLOUD

Most people in the United States own a smartphone that depends on
software made by either Apple or Google.33 Both companies provide
built-in online storage platforms for these devices that encourage users to
store important and highly personal information in the cloud.34 The
25. See infra section IV.A.
26. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 58–59; infra section IV.B.
27. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); infra Part IV.
28. See infra section IV.C.
29. See infra Part I.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. In December 2019, Apple’s operating system, iOS, accounted for an estimated 55.55% of the
mobile operating system market share in the United States. See Mobile Operating System Market
Share United States of America: Jan–Dec 2019, STATCOUNTER GLOB. STATS (Dec. 2019),
https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america/2019
[https://perma.cc/3LMW-T9WZ]. Google’s operating system, Android, accounted for an estimated
44.29%. See id. Together, the two operating systems accounted for an estimated 99.84% of the mobile
operating system market share in the United States. See id.
34. See iCloud: The Best Place for All Your Photos, Files, and More, APPLE,
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impressive capabilities provided by these platforms are possible because
of developments in electronic storage and network technology, which
have both undergone massive advancements in the last forty years.35
Cloud storage platforms have fundamentally changed how people interact
with technology: instead of storing a limited amount of data locally and
deleting it from online storage quickly, people store vast amounts of data
remotely in the cloud and keep it indefinitely.36 This key difference has
made information stored in the cloud by most Americans “detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”37
A.

Technological Advances Permit Massive Cloud Data Storage

Forty years ago, data storage was expensive and had severe capacity
limitations compared to today.38 Consider the 3.5-inch floppy disk from
the 1980s, which could hold 1.44 megabytes of data.39 Compare that to
the smallest storage size that Apple offers for their 2017 and newer
iPhones, which is 64,000 megabytes—a 44,444-fold increase.40 To
connect with devices in the cloud, Apple now offers 5,000 megabytes of
free storage and subscriptions plans with up to 2,000,000 megabytes of
capacity.41 Before Google launched their free email service in 2004, other
email providers offered users about four megabytes of storage.42 Today,
Google provides 15,000 megabytes of free storage in their online storage

https://www.apple.com/icloud/ [https://perma.cc/S9XU-XXY2]; Back Up or Restore Data on Your
Android Device, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/android/answer/2819582
[https://perma.cc/6ZLR-3PJY]; Upload Files and Folders to Google Drive, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/drive/answer/2424368 [https://perma.cc/JF8U-9HJR].
35. See infra section I.A.
36. See infra section I.B.
37. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018); see infra section I.B.
38. See R.J.T. Morris & B.J. Truskowsi, The Evolution of Storage Systems, 42 IBM SYS. J. 205,
205–06 (2003).
39. Steven Vaughan-Nichols, The History of the Floppy Disk, HEWLETT PACKARD ENTER.
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.hpe.com/us/en/insights/articles/the-history-of-the-floppy-disk1703.html [https://perma.cc/V8KJ-8L4W].
40. See Identify Your iPhone Model, APPLE (Dec. 1, 2020), https://support.apple.com/enus/HT201296 [https://perma.cc/3HWL-UCER]. 64,000 megabytes (the smallest storage size of 2017
and newer iPhones) divided by 1.44 megabytes (the storage size of 3.5-inch floppy disks) equals a
44,444.4444-fold increase in capacity.
41. See iCloud Storage Plans and Pricing, APPLE (Jan. 6, 2020), https://support.apple.com/enus/HT201238 [https://perma.cc/KTA6-XFM2] (stating that users automatically receive five gigabytes
of storage for free and can purchase subscriptions for up to two terabytes of storage).
42. See Paul Festa, Google to Offer Gigabyte of Free Email, CNET (Apr. 1, 2004),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1o32-51828o5.html [https://perma.cc/WKH4-RGXA] (emphasizing that
Google’s new email service would “dwarf those offerings” by offering 1,000 megabytes of storage).
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platform, which includes email, files, phone backups, and more.43 Google
also allows users to increase this capacity significantly with subscription
plans that provide up to 30,000,000 megabytes of storage.44
Massive storage capacity in the cloud is only effective if users can rely
seamlessly on accessing their stored information. Internet speeds have
increased dramatically in the last thirty years, enabling the proliferation
of online storage providers.45 In 1994, internet-connected smartphones
were unimaginable.46 For the few that had home internet access, the fastest
speed was twenty-eight kilobits per second (kbps).47 Today, the median
advertised home internet speed in the United States, including dial-up,48
is 6,300 kbps—a 225-fold increase.49 Cellular wireless network
technologies that were invented in the early 1990s advertised download
speeds of up to 200 kbps.50 In 2010, cellular networks using more modern
technology advertised average download speeds of between 5,000 and
12,000 kbps with peaks up to 50,000 kbps—up to a 250-fold increase from
the second-generation network.51
B.

Online Storage Platforms Facilitate Cloud Data Proliferation

These technological advances have led to a significant shift in user
behavior. Historically, messages sent on electronic communication
platforms were saved to the user’s computer and deleted from remote
storage in order to save space.52 This made sense, given capacity
limitations at the time. However, users today no longer need to be as
concerned about space constraints; instead of deleting data to save space,

43. See Storage FAQ, GOOGLE, https://one.google.com/faq/storage [https://perma.cc/UK875RGG] (noting that Google offers fifteen gigabytes of free storage).
44. See Joe Maring, How to Buy More Google Drive Storage, ANDROID CENT. (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.androidcentral.com/how-buy-more-google-drive-storage [https://perma.cc/AC2AHFAN] (noting that Google offers paid subscriptions for up to thirty terabytes of storage).
45. See U.S. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, OBI TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 4, BROADBAND
PERFORMANCE 11 (2010), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-300902A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R85A-8J9C].
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Dial up is a method of connecting to the internet with exclusive use of a telephone line. Dial
Up Internet Service, VERIZON WIRELESS, https://www.verizon.com/support/residential/
announcements/dial-up [https://perma.cc/TTZ7-FPGP]. Modern broadband connections are always
on and use different technology than dial up. Id.
49. See U.S. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 45, at 11.
50. Id. at 19.
51. See id.
52. See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373,
392–93 (2014).
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users commonly save everything—just in case—and search for it later.53
This new use pattern blurs the distinction between the privacy interests in
real-time and stored information because it has become commonplace to
store a deep record of digital communications that goes back months or
even years.
The breadth of private information stored in the cloud has similarly
skyrocketed. Fast internet speeds and improved storage technology allow
devices to “offer a range of tools for managing detailed information about
all aspects of” their users’ lives.54 Apps can be used to store passwords,
watch and record videos, send messages to friends, access bank accounts,
track fitness, and read the news. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
this “can form a revealing montage of the user’s life.”55 To preserve
important data, Apple and Google provide backup services for their
devices that store much of it in the cloud.56 These services generally
encrypt57 the stored information, meaning it is somewhat protected from
unauthorized access.58 However, the platforms themselves can usually
access the encrypted data because they keep the decryption key.59 As such,
cloud storage platforms generally can view much of this personal
information—which can then potentially be seized and searched pursuant
to a lawful order.
53. See id.
54. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014).
55. Id.
56. iCloud backup includes, inter alia, app data, device settings, text messages, photos, purchase
history, and the user’s voicemail password. See What Does iCloud Back Up?, APPLE (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207428 [https://perma.cc/5LKB-FNAL]. Android backup
includes, inter alia, contacts, text messages, wi-fi network passwords, app data, and phone settings.
See Back Up or Restore Data on Your Android Device, supra note 34.
57. Encrypted data cannot be viewed without using a decryption process that requires the right
cryptographic private key. See What Is Encryption? | Types of Encryption, CLOUDFLARE,
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-is-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/SD8V-BKQ4] (“A
cryptographic key is a string of characters used within an encryption algorithm for altering data so
that it appears random. Like a physical key, [a cryptographic key] locks (encrypts) data so that only
someone with the right [private] key can unlock (decrypt) it.”). Using encryption prevents
unauthorized parties who lack the right private key from accessing stored data. See id.
58. See iCloud Security Overview, APPLE (Nov. 18, 2019), https://support.apple.com/enus/HT202303 [https://perma.cc/M4MS-B78W]; Google and Android Have Your Back by Protecting
Your Backups, GOOGLE SEC. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2018), https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/googleand-android-have-your-back-by.html [https://perma.cc/T8X2-X5VP].
59. See iCloud Security Overview, supra note 58 (noting that iCloud backup does not use end-toend encryption for most data); Google and Android Have Your Back by Protecting Your Backups,
supra note 58 (stating that the newest Android version has an end-to-end encrypted backup feature
and that previous versions do not). End-to-end encryption prevents anyone besides the recipient at the
other end (who has the right private key) from accessing transmitted data. See What Is End-to-End
Encryption and How Does It Work?, PROTONMAIL (Mar. 7, 2018), https://protonmail.com/blog/whatis-end-to-end-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/RQ6F-XHGE].
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Both commentators and courts have recognized that the use of modern
smartphones and cloud storage platforms have led to paradigm shifts in
both the depth and breadth of stored information.60 A deep historical
record is created by people constantly carrying internet-connected devices
and storing functionally everything going back years. This record contains
a broad array of revealing personal information about all aspects of users’
lives. The Supreme Court has expressed concern when technology reveals
“an individual’s private interests or concerns” along with their “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”61 The Court has
also noted that some data stored in the cloud may not be shared with online
storage providers in a truly voluntary manner: “Cell phone users often
may not know whether particular information is stored on the device or in
the cloud, and it generally makes little difference.”62
Although smartphones illustrate the revealing nature of data stored in
the cloud, they are by no means fully responsible for the proliferation of
cloud storage use. Companies offer a vast array of non-smartphonespecific cloud storage options, such as OneDrive,63 Google Drive,64 and
Dropbox.65 Adobe provides cloud storage for artists’ photos and videos as
part of their popular Creative Cloud service.66 People even purchase home
security cameras with microphones that store all of their footage in the

60. See Kerr, supra note 52, at 393; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014); Carpenter v.
United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
61. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 395–96 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)); Kerr,
supra note 52, at 393.
62. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 397. “From the user’s perspective, the data that is stored on the phone
and the data that is stored in the cloud and available on the phone are often indistinguishable. App
data is continuously updated in order to ensure that the data is synchronized across all the users’
devices [even when the user does not have the apps open].” Brief of Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC) et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373
(2014) (No. 13-132), 2014 WL 975497.
63. See OneDrive, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/onedrive/onlinecloud-storage [https://perma.cc/GX53-6D6F] (“Save your files and photos to OneDrive and access
them from any device, anywhere.”).
64. See Google Drive, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/drive/ [https://perma.cc/6FP6CTWC] (“Easy and secure access to all of your content[:] Store, share, and collaborate on files and
folders from any mobile device, tablet, or computer.”).
65. See Dropbox Basic: Get a Dropbox Free Account, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/basic
[https://perma.cc/ZAU7-SMRM] (“With Dropbox Basic, it’s easy to get to your files from multiple
devices—computers, phones, and tablets—for free.”).
66. See Adobe Creative Cloud, ADOBE, https://www.adobe.com/creativecloud.html
[https://perma.cc/X33X-R68N] (“[T]he world’s best creative apps and services so you can make
anything you can imagine, wherever you’re inspired.”); Find Out How Much Storage You Have,
ADOBE, https://helpx.adobe.com/creative-cloud/kb/file-storage-quota.html [https://perma.cc/XJM82ZU5] (“Your Creative Cloud membership comes with cloud storage.”).
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cloud.67 Given the depth and breadth of data stored in the cloud, allowing
unrestrained government intrusions potentially exposes even more than
the most exhaustive search of a house—which is afforded strong Fourth
Amendment protections against government intrusion.68
II.

EXISTING PROTECTIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS
STORED IN THE CLOUD ARE LIMITED

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
and imposes specific warrant requirements to prevent a “general,
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”69 These protections
were motivated by invasive and arbitrary general warrant searches and
seizures in England and the American colonies.70 However, existing
doctrine limits the Fourth Amendment’s reach in the context of data stored
by third parties.71 Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the SCA in
1986 to provide some protection, but its statutory safeguards fall below
the Fourth Amendment baseline and were designed for the computer
network of the past.72 Courts have begun to recognize the privacy
implications of modern technology use; in many circumstances, courts
now require warrants notwithstanding lesser statutory standards.73 Still,
even when the government obtains a warrant, inconsistent approaches to
the particularity requirements for electronic searches lead to widely varied

67. See How Nest Cameras Store Your Recorded Video, GOOGLE NEST HELP,
https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/9242083 [https://perma.cc/B8S7-HQFF] (“A Google
Nest camera doesn’t use memory cards to store your video on the camera. Instead, it uploads your
video continuously to the cloud.”).
68. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“We have said that the Fourth Amendment
draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house . . . .’” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
590 (1980))).
69. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
70. See infra section II.A.
71. See infra section II.B.
72. See infra section II.C; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure . . . shall issue only if
the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the . . . information sought, [is] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”); OFF. OF LEGAL EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS
AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 127–34 (2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SRA-WERW] (noting that § 2703(d) orders instead of warrants can compel
disclosure of the contents of electronic communications in some circumstances). Professor Orin Kerr
articulated a similar argument in 2004. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1209–13. However, developments
in Fourth Amendment law have led Professor Kerr to suggest that the content of communications
such as email may receive constitutional protection. See Kerr, supra note 52, at 399–400.
73. See infra section II.C.
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levels of judicial oversight.74
A.

Foundational Fourth Amendment Principles

The purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials.”75 This has been clear since its adoption—its protections were
motivated by arbitrary and unreasonable privacy invasions by the
British.76 In England during the late 1400s and early 1500s, the British
used “general warrants” to conduct unjustified searches “wherever it shall
please them.”77 The invasiveness of searches worsened in the early 1600s
with the creation of “writs of assistance” that expanded the scope of
general-warrant searches.78 These searches were “abhorred by the
[American] colonists.”79 During the first judicial challenge to the writs in
the American colonies, the lawyer arguing against the practice gave an
influential oratory that, according to John Adams, “breathed into this
nation the breath of life.”80 Although the challenge failed,81 the Supreme
Court has characterized the lawyer’s oratory “as perhaps the most
prominent event” inaugurating the resistance of the colonies.82 The Court
has also stated it is “familiar history” that such searches and seizures
“were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the
Fourth Amendment.”83
To prevent unbridled authority in conducting invasive intrusions, the
Fourth Amendment safeguards “persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government.84 Under
Katz v. United States85 and its progeny, government action is a search
under the Fourth Amendment if it violates a person’s “reasonable

74. See infra section II.D.
75. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun.
Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
76. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 20–21 (1966);
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965).
77. LANDYNSKI, supra note 76, at 21 (citing 1 A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY
OF STATIONERS OF LONDON, 1554–1640, A.D., at xxxi (Edward Arber ed., 1875)).
78. Id. at 22–23.
79. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
80. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 59 (1970).
81. Id. at 63.
82. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965).
83. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
85. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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expectation of privacy.”86 This standard has two discrete components:
(1) a person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,” and (2) that expectation must be “one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”87 If either component is not satisfied, the
Fourth Amendment does not apply.88 Katz explicitly rejected the
prevailing interpretation that only property interests control; instead, the
Court emphatically stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places.”89
Once government action implicates the Fourth Amendment, it is
generally unreasonable in the absence of a valid warrant.90 The Fourth
Amendment permits warrants to be issued only “upon probable cause”
and requires that they “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,
and the . . . things to be seized.”91 Probable cause is a “fluid concept”92
that is satisfied when there is a reasonable basis to believe that an
individual has committed a crime—a determination that is highly
dependent on specific facts and circumstances.93 The dual “place” and
“things” requirements for particularity are closely related and factdependent; there must be probable cause that (1) the items will be found
in the specified place, and (2) the specifically described items are
connected with a crime.94 The warrant’s description must enable an officer
to reasonably identify the items that are authorized to be seized and permit
an issuing magistrate to determine whether the entire seizure is supported
by probable cause.95
86. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1978) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
88. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.1(b) (6th ed. 2020).
89. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
90. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (“Our cases have determined that ‘[w]here a
[Fourth Amendment] search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of
criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.’”
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995))).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
92. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
93. United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986); State
v. Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d 538, 548–49, 834 P.2d 611, 616–17 (1992); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 88,
§ 4.6(a). The specificity required for particularization depends greatly on individual facts and
circumstances, including the crime and the items involved; often, “the sufficiency of a description of
items to be seized . . . cannot be made by reference to earlier decisions passing upon precisely the
same type of description.” Id. § 4.6(a). Instead, the description in each case must be evaluated in terms
of the purposes that underlie the particularization requirement. Id. Warrants should describe the items
to be seized as particularly as possible but use of generic categories does not necessarily invalidate a
warrant if it is not possible to use a more precise description. See Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963.
95. See Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963; 2 LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 4.6(a).
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The Supreme Court has identified two distinct constitutional
justifications for these requirements.96 First, there should be “a careful
prior determination of necessity” because “any intrusion in the way of
search or seizure is an evil.”97 Second, “searches deemed necessary should
be as limited as possible” to prevent “a general, exploratory rummaging
in a person’s belongings.”98 The authorization to search and seize should
be limited to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause
so that the government intrusion is carefully tailored to its justifications.99
B.

The Third-Party Doctrine Restricts the Fourth Amendment’s Reach

Various caveats have emerged over time to these bedrock Fourth
Amendment principles; among them—and crucial for data stored in the
cloud—is the third party doctrine.100 Its roots can be traced to Katz, which
clarified that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
[their] own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”101 In United States v. Miller,102 the Supreme Court relied in
part on this language to hold that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to bank records, such as checks and deposit slips, because they were
business records that were voluntarily disclosed to third parties.103 Three
years later, in Smith v. Maryland,104 the Court adopted similar reasoning
to find that pen registers, which were devices that recorded what phone
numbers were dialed but not conversations, did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment and therefore did not require a warrant.105
In the past, the Supreme Court also justified the third-party doctrine by

96. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
97. Id. (emphasis omitted).
98. Id.
99. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
100. See infra notes 103–115 and accompanying text. Other caveats to these bedrock principles
include the good faith exception, open fields, exigent circumstances, and community caretaking. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984) (good faith exception); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 88,
§ 1.3(a) (good faith exception); id. § 2.4(a) (open fields); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181–
84 (1984) (open fields); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–53 (1984) (exigent circumstances);
3 LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 6.1(f) (exigent circumstances); id. § 6.6(a) (community caretaking);
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (community caretaking).
101. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). But importantly, “what [one] seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at
351–52.
102. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
103. Id. at 442.
104. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
105. Id. at 740–46. Phone numbers are voluntarily disclosed to third parties, but the conversations
are not. See id.
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reasoning that individuals assume the risk that another person might
reveal their affairs to the government when they reveal their affairs to that
third party.106 But subsequent developments in Fourth Amendment
doctrine have clarified that the act of sharing is not itself determinative
and people can still retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in data
shared with a third party.107
Courts, policymakers, and commentors analyzing Miller and Smith
often identify a distinction between content and non-content.108 Content
is information that conveys the substance or meaning of a communication,
whereas non-content is information that does not.109 This distinction can
be traced to postal mail letters, where the content of the letter itself is
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection but the non-content addressing
information on the envelope is not.110 Similarly, the content of a phone
conversation is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, but the phone
number that is dialed (and revealed to third parties) is not.111 This principle
can also apply to the cloud, with a distinction between the content of
private communications and the non-content addressing or
subscriber information.
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) accepted the distinction
between content and non-content for data stored in the cloud but took the
position that a warrant is not required to obtain either content or noncontent.112 With regard to non-content, such as subscriber information and
transactions records, the DOJ suggested that the third-party doctrine
precludes any reasonable expectation of privacy at all.113 With regard to
content, for which users may have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the DOJ suggested that a “reasonable” subpoena may be used to compel
production,114 which would be subject to a lower standard than a
106. Id. at 740–44.
107. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018); infra section III.B.
108. See infra notes 131–136 and accompanying text; infra section II.C; Matthew J. Tokson, The
Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2112 (2009) (“The
content/noncontent distinction remains important in the constitutional and statutory law governing
the inspection of private communications, even as new technologies have dramatically altered the
nature of communication itself.”).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); Tokson, supra note 108, at 2112.
110. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); Tokson, supra note 108, at 2112.
111. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741–46.
112. OFF. OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 72, at 144–47 (stating that it is “well established that a
customer or subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in [their non-content] subscriber
information or transactional records” but “whether a user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of communications . . . will depend on the facts and circumstances”).
113. Id. at 144.
114. Id. at 145. Subpoenas are used by a variety of government actors to compel production of
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warrant.115 The DOJ’s view has recently been called into question, as
discussed further below,116 but it parallels the statutory framework that
protects information stored in the cloud today.
C.

Limited Statutory Protection from the Stored Communications Act

In 1986, against the backdrop of the third-party doctrine’s limitations
on constitutional protections, Congress enacted the SCA as a statutory
framework to safeguard electronic communications stored by thirdparties.117 The SCA incorporated computer network use patterns at the
time.118 Back then, online services had two main purposes.119 One purpose
was email, which was generally stored online only until it was delivered
to the user’s local machine.120 The other purpose was outsourcing
computing tasks, such as storing files remotely and processing large
amounts of data.121 To provide protection for these specific purposes, the
SCA regulates electronic communication services (such as email) and
remote computing services (such as remote file storage and data
processing).122 Despite that technology use patterns today are
fundamentally different than when the SCA was enacted over thirty years
ago, this framework still applies to stored electronic communications.
The SCA incorporated the distinction between content and noncontent, defining content as “any information concerning the substance,

documents, including business and tax records. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 4.13. The recipient
has an opportunity to challenge, or quash, the subpoena before producing the requested materials. Id.
Protection against unreasonable subpoenas traditionally flows from the Fifth Amendment, but the
Fourth Amendment is also implicated. Id.
115. See Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1945); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967) (noting that a subpoena must be “sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in
purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome”); 2
LAFAVE, supra note 88, § 4.13(a). Unlike warrants, which are used to prove a pending charge,
subpoenas are primarily used to discover evidence and ascertain the extent of wrongdoing to make a
charge. See Subpoena Duces Tecum v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 247 (4th Cir. 2000).
116. See infra notes 131–136 and accompanying text.
117. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13.
118. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1213–14.
119. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556–57.
120. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22 (1986).
121. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3.
122. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (electronic communication service defined as any service which
provides its users the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications); id. § 2510(17)
(electronic storage is defined as any temporary or intermediate storage of such a communication or
backup thereof); id. § 2711(2) (remote computing service defined as “the provision to the public of
computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system”); id.
§ 2510(14) (defining electronic communications system).
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purport, or meaning of that communication.”123 By its terms, the SCA
permits the government to compel disclosure of non-content and almost
all content held by cloud storage providers with a court order under
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) instead of a warrant.124 To obtain a 2703(d) order, the
government must present “specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the [information is] relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”125 This is a lower
standard than probable cause and does not require any showing of
wrongdoing by the user. The only type of information that requires a
warrant supported by probable cause is unopened email that has been in
storage for 180 days or less.126 In a concession to the reality of modern
technology use, some courts have construed the warrant requirement to
extend also to opened email in storage for 180 days or less.127
The protections afforded by the SCA were understandable at the time
it was enacted, considering the newly emerging third-party doctrine
combined with slow network speeds and the lack of electronic storage
capacity in the 1980s.128 However, due to seismic technological shifts,
some justifications for its distinctions may no longer hold.129 For example,
the distinction between unopened email stored less than 180 days (which
requires a warrant under the SCA) and other remotely stored data (which
does not) was only salient because, at the time, email was not stored by
online providers for long periods of time.130
Some courts have begun to recognize the implications of these
technological shifts on Fourth Amendment doctrine and accordingly have
required a warrant to access private communications. For example, in
United States v. Warshak,131 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit found that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the content of emails stored by service providers.132 The court analogized
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); id. § 2711(1) (“[T]he terms defined in section 2510 of this title have,
respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section . . . .”).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); id. § 2703(a)–(b) (compelled disclosure of content); id. § 2703(c)
(compelled disclosure of non-content, including subscriber information, telephone connection
records, and payment information); Kerr, supra note 15, at 1222–24.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
126. Id. § 2703(a).
127. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e think that
prior access is irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage.”).
128. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–46 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
741–46 (1979); Kerr, supra note 15, at 1213–18; supra Part I.
129. See supra Part I.
130. See supra Part I.
131. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
132. Id. at 285–86.
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email to postal mail, where the letter is content—entitled to full Fourth
Amendment protection—and the addressing information is non-content
that is not protected.133 “Given the fundamental similarities between email
and traditional forms of communication, it would defy common sense to
afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection.”134 Therefore, “to the
extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such
emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.”135 Other courts have
adopted this approach,136 and many cloud storage providers already
require a warrant to obtain private communications.137 However, the
Supreme Court has not yet settled the matter.
D.

Inconsistent Approaches to the Warrant Particularity Requirement

Even when the government uses a warrant to obtain private
communications stored in the cloud, courts take a variety of inconsistent
approaches to the warrant particularity requirement.138 In the context of
physical electronic storage media, such as hard drives and USB sticks,
sifting through large amounts of data at crime scenes to find information
responsive139 to a warrant is fraught with challenges. According to DOJ,
“it will be infeasible in almost every case” to search physical electronic
media at the scene because evidence may be mislabeled, hidden, or
otherwise “difficult to locate and retrieve without the appropriate tools
and time.”140 Courts also recognize that searches and seizures of physical
electronic media pose significant challenges because data are interspersed
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 288.
136. See, e.g., In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email
Address, Nos. 12-MJ-8119-DJW, 12-MJ-8191-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21,
2012) (“The Court finds the rationale set forth in Warshak persuasive and therefore holds that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails or faxes stored with, sent to, or received
thorough an electronic communications service provider.”); United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10,
39 n.39 (D.D.C. 2012) (reasonable expectation of privacy in email).
137. See Legal Process Guidelines: Government & Law Enforcement Within the United States,
APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RY8S-V5BC]; How Google Handles Government Requests for User Information,
GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/terms/information-requests [https://perma.cc/WF7X-X75Y];
About Our Practices and Your Data, MICROSOFT, https://blogs.microsoft.com/datalaw/our-practices
[https://perma.cc/9ZAV-UVYN].
138. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2); infra notes 147–163 and accompanying text.
139. Responsive information corresponds with the particularized terms of the warrant; conversely,
items that are outside the scope of the warrant’s terms are nonresponsive. See United States v. Ganias,
824 F.3d 199, 210 n.23 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Aboshady, 297 F. Supp. 3d 232, 236 (D.
Mass. 2018).
140. OFF. OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 72, at 76–77.
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throughout, making extraction and segregation of responsive data from
nonresponsive data potentially impossible without retaining the media
itself (or an exact copy).141 Even attempting to search physical electronic
media at the scene risks damaging evidence because simply using the
media might alter the stored data.142 Furthermore, seizures of physical
electronic media may be necessary for the government to establish the
authenticity and integrity of evidence at trial, and for the defendant to
challenge evidence through an independent forensic analysis.143
To address these challenges, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(e)(2) authorizes a two-step process for searches and
seizures of electronically stored data.144 The process begins with an initial
broader seizure of the physical electronic storage media, or the copying of
the data stored on it.145 Then, once the media is seized, the government
can subsequently search it at a later date to identify information that is
responsive to the warrant’s narrower subject matter restrictions.146
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz147 illustrates a deferential approach to
this Rule applied to seizures of private communications stored in the
cloud. The warrant issued in Pinto-Thomaz required production of data
stored in an Apple iCloud account that was associated with PintoThomaz’s email address.148 It demanded that Apple produce messages,
images, videos, files, documents, address book information, subscriber
and payment information, transaction records, Find My iPhone device
location connection logs, service information, along with “[a]ll records
and other information stored by the . . . user.”149 Instead of imposing
specific restrictions on the initial seizure from the service provider, the
warrant allowed the government to look through this vast quantity of
seized data to identify what might fall under the warrant’s more narrowly

141. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 212–14.
142. See id. at 212 n.28; OFF. OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 72, at 77–78. Computers continually
read from and write to the hard disk, which changes some of the information recorded there. OFF. OF
LEGAL EDUC., supra note 72, at 77–78. Furthermore, if a device is connected to the internet,
“someone at a remote location might be able to access the computer and delete data while
investigators are examining it on-site.” Id. at 77–78.
143. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 215–16. But see id. at 215 n.33 (“We do not suggest that
authentication of evidence from computerized records is impossible absent retention of an entire hard
drive or mirror.”).
144. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
148. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Pretrial Motions at Ex. D,
Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (No. S2 18-Cr.-579 (JSR)).
149. Id.
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particularized subject-matter limitations.150
The warrant included an explicit time limit on how old the messages in
the initial seizure could be but it did not specify such a limit for any other
categories of requested data.151 Even with these open-ended parameters,
the Pinto-Thomaz court found that the warrant was not facially overbroad
because “a temporal limitation is not an absolute necessity.”152
Notwithstanding the invasive nature of the initial seizure, the court held
that the more narrowly particularized subject matter limitations on the
subsequent search effectively limited the time frame concerned.153
However, those limitations were not clear to the FBI agent who searched
the materials, leading the agent to review materials that fell outside the
warrant’s limitations on the subsequent search.154
The government regularly applies for warrants that demand a vast array
of information from cloud storage providers. For example, a narcotics
investigator requested the authority to seize all content155 from an Apple
iCloud account.156 According to the agent’s affidavit, it was necessary to
copy the entire contents of the account to minimize interference with the
cloud storage provider’s business activities, protect privacy of other users,
and “effectively pursue this investigation.”157 Other examples include a
firearms trafficking investigator and a postal inspector who both requested
the authority to seize, among other things, “[t]he contents of all files and
other records stored on iCloud.”158 While each application also contained
150. See United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 357 F. Supp. 3d 324, 329–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
151. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Pretrial Motions, supra
note 148, at Ex. D. Perhaps surprisingly, not even “[a]ll records and other information stored by the
Subject Account’s user” had an explicit time limitation. Id.
152. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 306 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, No. 09-cr-625,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 719, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010)).
153. Id. at 306–07.
154. Pinto-Thomaz, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 330. Even after these violations, the court found “no ground
for imposing the ‘extreme remedy’ of blanket suppression” because the agent did not “grossly exceed”
the warrant’s terms, which “generally authorized widespread seizure of a number of broadly defined
categories of evidence.” Id. at 331.
155. The agent did not appear to be making a distinction between content and non-content. See
Application for a Search Warrant at Attach. B, In re the Search of Apple, Inc., No. 19MJ5303 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Search Warrant Application for cmdlc92@icloud.com] (requesting
subscriber information, billing records, electronic mail, files, cloud storage, location information,
and more).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 16. The agent did not provide any citations for these assertions. See id.
158. Application for a Search Warrant at Attach. B, In re the Search of Info. Associated with the
Apple ID & iCloud Account grindfamily1@gmail.com that Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple
Inc., No. 19-968M(NJ) (E.D. Wis. Feb. 20, 2020) [hereinafter Search Warrant Application for
grindfamily1@gmail.com] (firearms trafficking investigator); Application for a Search Warrant at 24,
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an enumerated list of items to obtain, the provisions above seem to make
such a list somewhat superfluous because the scope of the requested
seizure was, in effect, all information associated with the cloud storage
provider accounts.159
Not all courts endorse such a deferential approach to the
particularization of the initial seizure. For example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit suggested that warrants for
broad categories of data might be invalid under the Fourth Amendment
because “[t]hey require[] disclosure to the government of virtually every
kind of data that could be found in a social media account.”160 As such,
they should have been limited to communications between specific
persons and during specific periods.161 Some courts have gone even
further and suggested that cloud storage providers filter the requested
information using specifically designated search parameters before
providing it to the government.162 However, other courts have rejected this
approach, in part because incidental exposure to some nonresponsive
information is unavoidable even with searches of physical items.163 This
variation in approach by jurisdiction, with many adopting a deferential
approach, fails to provide consistent protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures of private communications stored in the cloud.

In re the Search of Info. Associated with peter_burno@icloud.com that Is Stored at Premises
Controlled by Apple, Inc, No. 3:19-MJ-00578-MMS (D. Alaska Nov. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Search
Warrant Application for peter_burno@icloud.com] (postal inspector).
159. See Search Warrant Application for grindfamily1@gmail.com, supra note 158, at Attach. B;
Search Warrant Application for peter_burno@icloud.com, supra note 158, at 23–26; Search Warrant
Application for cmdlc92@icloud.com, supra note 155, at Attach. B.
160. United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 974 (11th Cir. 2017).
161. Id. However, regardless of any potential Fourth Amendment violation, the court found that
the obtained evidence should not be excluded due to the good-faith exception. Id.
162. See In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that Is Stored at Premises
Controlled by Apple, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2014); In re the Search of Info. Associated
with [redacted]@mac.com That is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 145,
153–55 (D.D.C.), vacated, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157, 168 (D.D.C. 2014).
163. See In re the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that Is Stored at Premises
Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 157, 166 (D.D.C. 2014); United States v. Taylor, 764 F.
Supp. 2d 230, 237 (D. Me. 2011) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require the government to
delegate a prescreening function to the internet service provider or to ascertain which e-mails are
relevant before copies are obtained from the internet service provider for subsequent searching.”);
United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Nor does the Fourth Amendment
require the executing authorities to delegate a pre-screening function to the internet service provider
or to ascertain which e-mails are relevant before copies are obtained from the internet service provider
for subsequent searching.”).
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III. PAST UNREASONABLE SEIZURES ENABLED BY
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT
The Supreme Court has long recognized that technology has the
potential to increase the government’s power to conduct invasive and
unjustified seizures.164 When confronted with such technology, the Court
has expanded Fourth Amendment protection to “assure[] preservation of
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”165 One of those moments occurred when the
Court confronted invasive real-time telephone wiretapping, recognizing
its similarity to general warrants of the past.166 More recently, the Court
has reevaluated existing Fourth Amendment doctrine to maintain
protection for data that, due to its depth and breadth, has the potential to
be highly revealing.167
A.

Berger: Real-Time Wiretapping Recognized as Invasive

In 1967, the Supreme Court confronted real-time eavesdropping
through wiretapping, a then-modern technology that could enable highly
invasive searches and seizures of private communications.168 At the time,
a New York statute authorized judicial wiretap orders that were founded
on a “reasonable ground to believe that evidence of a crime may be thus
obtained,” not probable cause.169 The statute also required that orders state
their duration, with a maximum of two months (unless extended), the
telephone line (if relevant), and a particular description of “the person or
persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be
overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof.”170 An order could be
extended if it was “in the public interest”—a vague standard that did not
clearly require a new showing of probable cause.171
After examining the invasiveness of the seizure, the Court first
emphasized that a warrant based on probable cause is required under the
Fourth Amendment.172 Although some New York cases suggested that the
164. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
165. Id.
166. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967).
167. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (cell phones incident to arrest); Carpenter,
138 S. Ct. at 2217 (cell site location information).
168. Berger, 388 U.S. at 46–47.
169. Id. at 43 n.1.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 59.
172. Id. at 55 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
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statute’s “reasonable ground” requirement was equivalent, the Court
decided it “need not pursue the question further” because “the statute is
deficient on its face in other respects.”173
Specifically, the Court found that the statute did not satisfy the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant particularization requirement.174 While it did
require identification of the “persons whose communications . . . are to be
overheard,” the statute did not require particularity as to the specific crime
that was committed, the specific place to be searched, or the specific
communications to be seized.175 As such, the statute lacked the necessary
“precise and discriminate requirements” and instead authorized
“indiscriminate use” of wiretapping.176 The Court also found that “[t]he
need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the showing
required . . . is especially great in the case of eavesdropping” because
“[b]y its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that
is broad in scope.”177 The New York statute also impermissibly sanctioned
“long and continuous” eavesdropping that allowed officers to seize
communications “indiscriminately and without regard to their connection
with the crime under investigation.”178 The Court found that the statute
was unconstitutional because it authorized invasive general-warrant
searches that the Fourth Amendment was specifically intended
to prevent.179
Just one year after Berger, Congress enacted Title III to regulate realtime wiretapping.180 This new statute was designed to meet and build on
Berger’s requirements.181 Along with an explicit warrant requirement,
Title III also mandates minimization requirements,182 notice to targets,
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 58–59.
176. Id. at 58.
177. Id. at 56.
178. Id. at 59. The Court also required a showing of “present probable cause” instead of only
relying on the original grounds in the initial order. Id.
179. Id. at 58.
180. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 212
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also Susan Freiwald, Online
Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 21–23 (2004).
“Commentators use either ‘Title III’ or the ‘Wiretap Act’ to refer to the law.” Freiwald, supra, at
13 n.22.
181. Freiwald, supra note 180, at 24 (“When Congress passed the Wiretap Act in 1968, it benefited
from the Supreme Court’s recent guidance.”).
182. Title III mandates that every wiretap order and extension “contain a provision that the
authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way
as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this
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extensive involvement of a judicial officer, and even prohibits
wiretapping until conventional techniques have failed.183 At least one
commentator has called a Title III judicial order for wiretapping a “superwarrant.”184 The statutory provisions in Title III provide even stronger
privacy protections than those required in Berger and demonstrate that
legislation can create an effective statutory framework that exceeds a
constitutional baseline.
B.

Riley and Carpenter: Highly Revealing Nature of Stored Data
Leads to Revised Fourth Amendment Doctrines

The Supreme Court has recently re-examined existing Fourth
Amendment doctrines in the context of highly revealing searches and
seizures but has not yet considered the Fourth Amendment protections for
private communications stored in the cloud. First, in Riley v. California,185
the Court narrowed the authority for officers to search the contents of cell
phones seized incident to a lawful arrest. The Court explicitly rejected the
argument that searching data stored directly on a cell phone is
indistinguishable from searches of physical containers.186 Instead, the
Court found that “[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a
qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s
person.”187 Given their immense storage capacity and propensity to collect
many distinct types of information, cell phones store a deep record of
users’ everyday lives.188 Furthermore, the breadth of data collected—
including location information, messages, a plethora of apps, browsing
data, and search history—“can form a revealing montage of the user’s
life.”189 These factors led the Court to require a warrant prior to searching
a cell phone, even incident to arrest.190
Four years later, in Carpenter v. United States,191 the Court confronted
chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days.
In the event the intercepted communication is in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that
foreign language or code is not reasonably available during the interception period, minimization may
be accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
183. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802; Freiwald, supra note 180, at 25.
184. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 630 (2003).
185. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
186. Id. at 392–93.
187. Id. at 393.
188. Id. at 393–94.
189. Id. at 396.
190. Id. at 401.
191. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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the warrantless acquisition of cell phone users’ stored location
information under the SCA.192 Cell phones connect to towers near their
users for communication, and cellular providers store these time-stamped
records of their customers’ approximate locations over time; these records
are called cell-site location information (CSLI).193 Although wireless
providers collect and store these records for their own business
purposes,194 CSLI also “provides an intimate window into a person’s life,
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his
‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”195
Furthermore, because cell phones are “indispensable to participation in
modern society” and “[v]irtually any activity on the phone generates
CSLI,” users do not “voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a
comprehensive dossier of [their] physical movements.”196
Even though CSLI arguably consists of business records held by a third
party, the Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the
collection of CSLI and instead required a warrant.197 In Carpenter, the
Court made it clear that “the fact that the information is held by a third
party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment
protection.”198 The Court also noted that it “has never held that the
Government may subpoena third parties for records in which the suspect
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”199 Taken together, Riley and
Carpenter suggest that, when technology enables the depth and breadth
of stored data to become sufficiently “detailed, encyclopedic, and
effortlessly compiled,”200 courts should evaluate such impacts to protect
users’ reasonable expectation of privacy.
IV. PROTECTING A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD
It is paramount to recognize when technology enables the government
to conduct searches and seizures that are akin to general warrant searches
192. Id. at 2212–13.
193. See id. at 2211–12.
194. Id. at 2212.
195. Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
196. Id. at 2220 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)).
197. Id. Although the Court required a warrant for seven days of CSLI, it left open the possibility
that accessing a more “limited period” of CSLI might survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Id. at
2217 n.3.
198. Id. at 2217.
199. Id. at 2221.
200. See id. at 2216.
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the framers intended to prohibit, especially in light of the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment—to prevent officers from having unbridled discretion
to perform unreasonable government intrusions. As with real-time
wiretapping in Berger, seizing private communications stored in the cloud
without sufficient safeguards is akin to an invasive general warrant search.
To provide sufficient safeguards, courts should consider the fundamental
privacy implications of seizing what is often years’ worth of revealing
private communications stored in the cloud and adopt Fourth Amendment
doctrine to prevent such invasive and unreasonable seizures.
A.

Seizures of Private Communications in the Cloud Should Require a
Warrant and Probable Cause

A warrant should be required to obtain private communications stored
in the cloud due to the highly invasive nature of such seizures. Users often
store years of wide-ranging private communications in the cloud.201
Seizures of such communications “form a revealing montage of the user’s
life,”202 and cloud storage platforms have become functionally
“indispensable to participation in modern society,”203 akin to
smartphones. When users store intimate information in the cloud,
including video and audio recordings from inside their homes,204 it seems
clear they possess a subjective expectation of privacy in those stored
communications. Additionally, given the ubiquity of online storage
platforms today and their intimate interdependence with modern
devices,205 society appears to recognize this expectation as reasonable.206
Berger supports these conclusions—it made clear that obtaining
functionally every communication a person had over an extended period
of time required a warrant supported by probable cause.207 Although the
threat then was real-time wiretapping, the government today can obtain
years’ worth of messages that a user sends and receives, location history,
photos, videos, phone backups, and more from the cloud.208 Furthermore,
the Court underscored in Carpenter that users can retain a reasonable
201. See supra section I.B.
202. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014); see also supra section I.B.
203. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; see also supra section I.B.
204. See supra section I.B.
205. See supra section I.B.
206. Prominent cloud storage providers like Apple, Google, and Microsoft seem to agree that the
Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant for private communications stored
in the cloud. See supra notes 131–137 and accompanying text (warrant based on probable cause
required to obtain user content stored in the cloud).
207. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55–59 (1967); supra section III.A.
208. See supra notes 122–163 and accompanying text; supra section I.B.
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expectation of privacy in data stored with a third party if that data are
sufficiently revealing and the technology is indispensable.209 Accordingly,
courts should recognize the necessity for a warrant requirement to obtain
private communications stored in the cloud and invalidate the SCA to the
extent that it allows access to such data without a warrant and with a lower
standard than probable cause.
B.

Berger-like Enhanced Particularity Requirements Should Apply

Given the inconsistent approaches to the particularity requirement for
electronic searches and seizures, a warrant is necessary but not sufficient
to safeguard private communications stored in the cloud. Courts should
recognize, as in Berger, that “[t]he need for particularity and evidence of
reliability in the showing required . . . is especially great” for
communications held in the cloud because such seizures involve “an
intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope.”210 Furthermore, as the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted, it is crucial to
engage with the technological specifics.211 With these considerations in
mind, courts should balance users’ privacy interests with officers’
legitimate need to find evidence of wrongdoing—as long as there is
probable cause.
Under this approach, a warrant that authorizes the initial seizure of all
information stored by the user212 of a cloud storage provider account
would by facially invalid due to the lack of particularization. Instead, the
government should be required to particularize the warrant to the extent it
can do so without requiring the platform to comb through the content of
users’ private communications. A government mandate that forces cloud
storage providers to build highly specialized systems and hire staff to
comb through the content of user data would have privacy implications
for other users and interfere with the provider’s business activities.213
Temporal limitations, such as “all messages sent and received between
these dates,” should be required because they do not require any
knowledge of the content of communications. In addition, warrants should
particularly describe the type of content requested and show the probable
cause that supports such a request. Communications stored in the cloud

209. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018); see also supra
notes 192–200 and accompanying text.
210. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 56; supra section I.B.
211. United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 217 (2d Cir. 2016).
212. See supra notes 147–154 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 155–157 and accompanying text; Bihter Ozedirne, Note, Fourth Amendment
Particularity in the Cloud, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1223, 1239–40 (2018).
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can take a wide variety of forms, including text messages, email, photos,
videos, files, browsing history, phone backups, and more.214 If the
government has information that suggests two individuals used a cloud
storage account to contact each other in furtherance of a crime during a
specified time period, that would support probable cause for the
government to seize any messages between those individuals during the
specified period. But, standing alone, that information should not be
sufficient to support probable cause permitting the government to also
seize photos or browsing history from that same period.
Particularization of this sort is possible because the government can
request specific categories of information from the cloud storage
provider.215 This makes searches in the cloud materially different from
searches of physical electronic storage media: there is no scene of the
crime, so to speak, and no need for the government to conduct a forensic
analysis of the raw storage media to discover evidence. Furthermore,
probable cause can be more specifically associated with the categories of
data that are initially seized. Thus, the traditional justifications for
allowing unrestrained initial seizures of physical electronic storage
media216 apply with less force, and the intermediary role of the provider
should generally permit reasonable limits on the initial seizure.
C.

Compatible Statutory Protections Should Provide Future
Comprehensive Framework

The proposed safeguards in this Comment are designed as a
constitutional baseline, not a comprehensive regulatory framework. Like
with Berger and Title III, Congress should build off this constitutional
approach and enact revised statutory protections.217 Ideally, these
protections would go beyond the baseline to protect users’ reasonable
expectation of privacy while still addressing the government’s legitimate
interest in investigating wrongdoing. For example, akin to Title III,
Congress could permit the acquisition of private communications stored
in the cloud only for a specific list of enumerated offenses, require that
traditional investigatory techniques be tried first and fail, or require notice

214. See supra section I.B.
215. See Legal Process Guidelines, supra note 137 (specifying twenty-three different categories of
available information and asking that government requests “be as narrow and specific as possible”);
Requests for User Information FAQs, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/transparencyreport/
answer/9713961 [https://perma.cc/63MG-77D5] (specifying a variety of types of available
information depending on the relevant Google services).
216. See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text.
217. See Freiwald, supra note 180, at 24–26.
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to targets of the investigation.218 Congress could also mandate specific
minimization requirements, such as a presumptive maximum temporal
limit for the acquisition of private communications that could only be
overcome with a heightened showing in specified circumstances.
Regardless, any statutory safeguards should mandate the extensive
involvement of the court in the entire process.
CONCLUSION
Although users store a vast amount of private information in the cloud,
such information currently only receives limited protection from
unreasonable government intrusions. Existing statutes allow the
government to obtain many private communications without a warrant
and using a lower standard than the constitutional baseline of probable
cause. Even with a warrant, inconsistent approaches to particularization
fail to provide consistent protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. These intrusions into private communications are at least as
invasive as the real-time wiretapping that Berger v. New York found was
akin to a general warrant search—which the Fourth Amendment was
designed to prohibit.
To prevent unjustified and invasive general warrant seizures of private
communications stored in the cloud, this Comment proposes an approach
akin to Berger that accounts for the invasiveness of collecting large
amounts of revealing information that can reach back years. A warrant
based on probable cause should be a baseline requirement. Additionally,
enhanced particularization of the warrant’s parameters should be required
to ensure that the government cannot seize large amounts of
nonresponsive information. Further, by establishing a protective
constitutional backstop, this approach could provide an incentive for
Congress to enact a modernized statutory framework that fully protects
users’ privacy in the cloud.

218. See supra notes 180–184 and accompanying text.

